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REGULATING INFORMATION FLOWS:
STATES, PRIVATE ACTORS AND E-COMMERCE
Henry Farrell

INTRODUCTION
On April 7, 2005, the World Trade Organization’s appellate body
ruled on a dispute over services between the United States and
the state of Antigua and Barbuda. The US had taken various
measures that had made it much more difficult for US citizens to
access online gambling and betting services based on Antiguan
territory. In particular, US authorities had sought to prevent third
party businesses, such as banks and credit card agencies, from
allowing financial transactions between US-based gamblers and
Antiguan gambling websites. This led the Antiguan government to
take an action at the World Trade Organization, claiming that US
behaviour violated the commitments it had made to free trade in
services.
The details of the World Trade Organization’s final decision
(which seemed to favour the US) are of more interest to
international trade lawyers than to most scholars of international
politics. However, the underlying dispute between the US and
Antigua speaks directly to an important lacuna in our theories of
international relations - how and when states rely on private
actors to achieve policy goals. In pressing credit card agencies and
banks into service as regulators of the offshore gambling industry,
the US was using private actors as proxies to achieve international
outcomes that it would otherwise have had difficulty in achieving.
These actions“effectively prohibit[ed] all supply of gambling and
betting services from Antigua to the US ” (Sanders 2004), although
they may prove ineffective in preserving the US gambling regime
over the longer term.
State-private actor relationships of this kind play a key role in
many areas of international economic regulation. States are
increasingly willing to use private actors as proxies to achieve
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policy goals at second hand. Moreover, the relative ability of states
to influence private actors can have important implications for
international and domestic political outcomes.
In order to understand why, it is necessary first to appreciate the
nature of the underlying problem. Briefly put, globalization, and in
particular the rapid increase in the flows of financial resources and
information across borders, have important consequences both for
policy interdependence and the role of the state. The weakening of
controls on cross-border information and resource flows is leading
to a far greater degree of interdependence between states’ domestic
policies than had hitherto existed (Farrell 2003a). Increasingly, one
state’s domestic choices over how to regulate information flows
have implications for the choices of other states. The rapid
development of e-commerce and the Internet have led to
international controversy in sensitive social areas such as access to
gambling, pornography and extremist political material. Any
individual state will find it difficult to control the materials or
services that their citizens have access to, when other states allow
the dissemination of these materials or services on the Internet.
This means, as Suzanne Berger (2000) has noted, that increased
interdependence is leading to a new politicization of the state as a
protector of social values that are challenged by economic and
informational flows across borders. As information flows across
state borders increase, and as the domestic policy choices to
regulate certain kinds of information (say, to ban pornography) are
undermined, so we may expect increasing demands placed upon
states, to regulate these flows and restore the status quo ante. One
way in which states can do this is to press private actors into
service as regulators on their behalf, in policy areas where the
states themselves lack the tools or expertise to provide effective
regulation (Mattli and Büthe 2005, forthcoming). In order to
prevent undesired cross-border flows of information, states will
often be tempted to turn, as the US did, to key private actors
which can then police information flows on their behalf.
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Yet even if we can describe the secular changes in underlying
structural conditions that make states more likely to consider
using key private actors as proxies, we still have difficulty in
making useful predictions. When exactly will states rely on private
actors to achieve their policy goals, and when will they employ
other policy instruments (international treaties, bilateral
cooperation and the like)? When will states succeed in pressing
private actors into service, and when will they fail?
International relations theory has trouble in answering these
questions; it is only in the last decade or so that it has really begun
to advance testable propositions about the role of private actors in
the global economy. Most work to date has focused on examining
how private actors may influence states, or how private actors
might (or might not) be creating separate spheres of governance for
themselves, independent of state authority. Until very recently,
(Büthe and Mattli 2005), little sustained attention has been paid to
the question of how and when states might seek to influence
private actors, or work through them.
Private actors play an especially important role in the governance
of many aspects of e-commerce and the Internet. Legal scholars
have engaged in a wide-ranging debate of what this means, but
with a few exceptions (Kobrin 1998, Farrell 2003, Drezner 2004),
there has been little effort to connect this debate to the arguments
being conducted in parallel in political science. While the legal
academic literature is largely oriented either towards empirics or
towards normative questions, it provides important insights. In
particular, some legal scholars (Benkler 2000, Zittrain 2003,
Birnhack and Elkin-Koren 2003, Reidenberg 2005) have begun to
ask interesting questions about the intersection between the
formal jurisdiction of states and their ability to influence private
actors. Even though this vein of scholarship has sought more to
offer a nuanced description than to provide testable propositions,
it can be developed to offer some interesting hypotheses.
In this article, I seek to bring these two literatures - the debate on
state-private actor relations in political science, and the literature
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on Internet and e-commerce governance among legal scholars together. I show that a creative combination of arguments from
both literatures can provide the basics of a unified framework for
understanding (a) when states will seek to use private actors as
proxy regulators rather than working through other policy
instruments, and (b) when they will be successful in pressing
private actors to implement their preferences. By combining
political scientists’ arguments about bargaining strength with legal
scholars’ claims about regulatory arbitrage and “points of control,”
I construct a basic explanatory framework. While I do not
undertake to provide an exhaustive test of this framework in this
article, I show that it seems to provide a good explanation for
controversies over Internet gambling, privacy and e-commerce
taxation.
I note that the framework presented in this article doesn’t aspire
to provide a complete account of state-private actor relations. It
doesn’t examine how private actors may influence states (Sell
2003), nor how private actors may work together with states to
create rules (Mosley unpublished), nor yet the circumstances
under which states may press for the creation of private regulatory
actors where no such actors exist. Nonetheless, by adopting a
narrower focus, it provides a set of testable predictions as to the
circumstances under which states will or will not use private
actors as proxy regulators.
The first main section provides a short discussion of international
relations debates over the relationship between states and private
actors. The next section goes on to discuss debates among lawyers
over Internet regulation, which provide both rich empirical
accounts, and important theoretical insights. Then, I seek to build
on both discussions to provide a basic framework of analysis. The
penultimate section shows how this framework may be applied to
various issue-areas affected by cross-border information flows.
Finally, I discuss the implications of this argument for other areas
of the international political economy.
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND NON-STATE
ACTORS
International relations theory has historically been a profoundly
state-centered discipline, at least in North America. Dominant
strains of thought (most prominently realism) have argued that
state interaction and the forces which structure it are at the core
of international politics. Until quite recently, non-state actors
have only been studied at the margins of the discipline. Although
some early work (Nye and Keohane 1971, Keohane and Ooms
1975) illustrated that a variety of non-state actors had
consequences for international politics, it did not go beyond this
observation to create the theoretical basis necessary for a
sustained debate. Accordingly, serious debate about the role of
private actors and their relationship to the state system was
usually conducted by international relations scholars who selfconsciously disassociated themselves from the North American
mainstream.
This was not true of comparative political economy, where
scholars of Western Europe began in the late 1970’s to study how
states not only were influenced by interest groups but could use
corporatist institutions to co-opt these interest groups so as to
achieve economic stability (Schmitter 1979, 1981, Rhodes 2002).
A thriving literature in German (the Steuerung approach) sought
to build more generalizable theories about the conditions under
which states could influence private actors (Lütz 2003). However,
this literature had little impact on debates within international
relations. Scholars of corporatism found that it was difficult to
reproduce corporatist style institutions at the international level,
even in institutionally thick settings such as the European Union
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991, Crouch and Menon 1997). Similarly,
scholars of Steuerung concluded that it had no proper analogy in
the international sphere, where there was no overarching state
authority (Mayntz 1998).
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Perhaps surprisingly, this literature in comparative politics has
had little impact on debates among international relations
theorists. The resurgence of interest in non-state actors among the
latter (O’Neill, Balsiger and VanDeveer 2004) can be traced back to
two, partially overlapping bodies of literature. First,
constructivists began in the early 1990’s to argue that non-state
actors - most particularly non-governmental organizations - played
an important role in international politics. Much of this work
sought specifically to undermine the existing state-centered
perspective, by arguing that non-governmental organizations and
other non-state actors were creating a transnational ‘civic society’
that transcended national boundaries, and that might eventually
replace the traditional structures of international politics (Wapner
1995). From this perspective, states (or, more precisely
governments and government agencies) were only one set of actors
among many in an increasingly complex and multilayered global
system. Some scholars (Kobrin 1998) in this tradition implicated
technological change in their accounts of the breakdown of
traditional state structures. They argued that the Internet and
other communications technologies were helping create an
international system which in some ways resembled the old Holy
Roman Empire, with complex, overlapping jurisdictions and
loyalties. Others made narrower arguments about the role of
private actors in international politics, not seeking to argue that
they were fundamentally transforming the international system so
much as to explore the specific ways in which they affected
international outcomes. In particular, a group of moderate
constructivists sought to examine the circumstances under which
states and international institutions could be influenced by nonstate actors (Risse 1995, Keck and Sikkink 1998; see also Sell
2003).
Second, international relations theorists began to build on the
work of Susan Strange (1996) and of radical approaches to
international political economy, arguing that the increasing power
of financial markets not only limited the policy choices that were
open to states, but also transferred power to non-state actors in the
financial sector and elsewhere. Marxists such as Claire Cutler
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(2003) argued that private actors were constructing their own
transnational systems of governance through the lex mercatoria
and other instruments, and thus insulating themselves from
pressures of democratic accountability. Others sought to make
more general arguments about the increasing power of private
actors to create transnational systems of governance, and the
challenges that this created for traditional conceptions of
international politics (Cutler, Haufler & Porter 1999, Hall &
Biersteker 2002, Cutler 2003, Kahler and Lake 2003, Stone-Sweet
2004).
Crucially, both of these literatures emerged in contention with the
existing, state-centric perspective. Thus, they sought explicitly or
implicitly to deny the realist claim that non state actor activity is
epiphenomenal, and more or less fully determined by the structure
of interactions among states, by pointing to (a) the ways in which
non-state actors may construct realms of interaction that are not
under the control of states (and that might perhaps in time
undermine the existing state system, or (b) the direct and
measurable influence of non-state actors on state preferences and
choices. With only isolated exceptions (Grande and Pauly 2005),
they devoted little if any attention to the ways in which states
might influence non-state actors. Nor, with very occasional
exceptions (Farrell 2003a, Lehmkuhl 2003, Drezner 2004), did their
critics seek to examine this aspect of state-private actor
interaction. Realist theory in particular has difficulty in
conceptualizing the circumstances under which states might want
to work through private actors. As a consequence, there is an
important gap in the existing literature. We have an extensive
literature discussing the circumstances under which private actors
may influence states, a somewhat less extensive debate about the
ways in which private actors may be reshaping the fundamentals
of the Westphalian system, and a growing body of work on how
private actors may create their own systems of governance,
independent of states. However, we have very little work indeed
discussing the circumstances under which states might wish to
work through private actors in order to affect outcomes, or the
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circumstances under which they might succeed in so doing
(Mosley unpublished, Mattli and Büthe 2005).
There is however, a related literature that provides some
predictions as to the circumstances under which states will be
successful in influencing private actors to work on their behalf,
even if it has less to say about when they will want to work
through private actors in the first place. This small but important
body of work borrows from both from sanctions theory (Rodman
1994, Shambaugh 1996) and comparative politics, examining how
market power and domestic institutions affect the ability of states
to influence private actors. Different modes of state-private actor
interaction are not only likely to be associated with differences in
the domestic political economy (Lütz 2003, Newman & Bach
2004), but also with variation in international outcomes (Rodman
1994, Shambaugh 1996, Farrell 2003b, Bach & Newman 2003,
Mattli & Büthe 2004). Kenneth Rodman (1994) argues that the
power of both political authorities and non governmental
organizations to make multinational corporations disengage from
South Africa was limited, because they could offer only
inducements, not commands. George Shambaugh (1996) examines
how the success of the US sanctions regime in inducing
compliance in foreign firms was a function of the foreign firms’
dependence on US markets. Henry Farrell (2003b) argues that
differences in EU and US domestic regimes explain the relative
ability of the EU and US to shape international outcomes in ecommerce policy. David Bach and Abraham Newman (2003) seek
to explain outcomes in the international regulation of personal
information and financial services by looking to differences in
domestic regulatory systems. Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe (2004)
provide evidence that domestic institutional legacies have
important consequences for battles over international technical
standards.
While these scholars work from different traditions in rational
choice and historical institutionalism, they all emphasize some
version of bargaining power (Knight 1992, Krasner 1991) as the key
explanatory factor. A state’s ability to induce cooperation from a
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private actor will depend on its ability to make credible threats or
promises to the private actor, which will then motivate the private
actor to behave in the desired fashion. Thus, for example, in
Shambaugh’s account, the US government was able to induce
foreign firms to comply with extraterritorial sanctions by making
a credible threat to cut off access to US markets for non-complying
firms. Where the US did not have bargaining leverage of this kind,
it had little success in inducing compliance. Shambaugh, like
Drezner (2004) and others, argues that the key determinant of state
bargaining power vis-à-vis private actors is the size and
importance of a state’s internal market. However, this misses out
on the role of institutions as a crucial intervening variable – states
will not be able to use market size as leverage unless they have
appropriate regulatory instruments available to them (Newman
and Posner 2005). As Edgar Grande and Louis Pauly (2005) argue,
the domestic institutional capacities of states are a key component
of their bargaining power.
Other scholars have sought to incorporate institutions directly
into their theories as a factor conditioning bargaining power. For
example, both Farrell and Bach and Newman seek to include
institutions as a key variable, arguing that the two key factors
explaining a state’s bargaining power vis-a-vis a particular private
actor are (a) whether the state has effective jurisdiction over an
important asset of the private actor, and (b) whether or not the
institutional framework within the state provides it with policy
instruments that allow it to make credible threats or promises
with respect to this asset. Ceteris paribus, when a state has both
effective jurisdiction and the means to make credible threats, it
will be in a strong position to press the private actor in question to
conform to its preferences.
Thus, in conclusion, there is an important gap in our
understanding of international politics; remarkably little work has
been done on the circumstances under which states might wish to
work through private actors, rather than through other available
means. There is a small body of work which provides an approach
to one aspect of state-private actor relations - theorizing the
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relative influence of states vis-a-vis specific private actors.
However, it doesn’t provide much help in answering a broader set
of questions. When will states choose to use their possible
influence vis-a-vis private actors to press these actors into service
as effective regulators? When will they choose other instruments,
such as multilateral organizations? In order to begin to answer
these questions, it is necessary first to discuss a second body of
literature - legal scholars’ work on Internet governance - and then
to integrate insights from these two literatures into a common
framework.

LAW AND THE INTERNET
Debates among legal scholars over the political implications of ecommerce and the Internet provides an important set of
complementary insights into the changing relationship between
states and private actors. In addition to discussing how new
technological developments would affect specific areas of the law,
legal academics have engaged in a far more wide reaching
discussion of the implications of the Internet for law, politics and
society. These debates have centered around two issues that are of
direct relevance to political scientists - the extent to which the
Internet and e-commerce have empowered private actors vis-a-vis
governments, and the extent to which the Internet and ecommerce challenged basic notions of states’ territorial
jurisdiction.
Both debates had their beginnings with David Johnson and David
Post’s (1996) essay on law, borders and cyberspace. Johnson and
Post argued that cyberspace undermined the relationship between
physical geography and online activity. As a result, it undermined
traditional law, which relied on the existence of borders in
physical space. Events on the Internet occurred both everywhere
and nowhere, so that no one government had any more right than
any other to subject actions to its law. Johnson and Post argued
that cyberspace should be considered to be its own space,
independent of existing geographic territories, and that
independent self-regulatory structures should be allowed to govern
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it, and to provide its “law.” Johnson and Post’s prescriptions fit
well with a more general enthusiasm among libertarians for the
Internet, which they saw as potentially undermining the power of
governments to dictate how their citizens communicated with
each other and fostering individual freedom (Barlow 1996). In the
much quoted (but difficult to source) words of John Gilmore,
libertarians argued that the Internet “interprets censorship as
damage, and routes around it.” Scholars argued too that ecommerce would be governed not by states, but by self-regulation,
and by the preferences of firms (Simon 2000, Spar 1998, but also
see Spar 2001). US government decision makers claimed that selfregulation was the best approach to most policy problems
associated with e-commerce, and sought to encourage its
international spread (White House 1997).
These arguments came under sustained criticism towards the end
of the 1990s. Lawrence Lessig (1999) argued that libertarian visions
of cyberspace grossly underestimated the extent to which
computer code could be used as an instrument of control. There
was no compelling reason to believe that “open” forms of code,
which enhanced individual freedom, would continue to
predominate. Jack Goldsmith (2000) contended that jurisdictional
problems were greatly overstated, and that states, far from being
paralyzed, were willing and able to take unilateral action in order
to achieve their policy goals. By 2003, Michael Geist (2003) felt
safe in concluding that many of the truisms of early debates on the
Internet had been decisively refuted; contrary to initial
predictions, the Internet and e-commerce were increasingly
subject to effective state regulation.
Even if some of Johnson and Post’s arguments about selfregulation are no longer applicable, their claim about the
jurisdictional consequences of the Internet is still compelling.
States continue to face pervasive problems of jurisdictional
ambiguity in the realm of e-commerce, which traditional legal
doctrines have difficulty in resolving (Geist 2001). In many issue
areas, it is still an open question as to which state’s laws should
prevail when. Indeed, the ability of states to take unilateral action
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in order to pursue their policy goals complicates matters even
further (Benkler 2000, Geist 2003). A state may face challenges not
only in dealing with the behaviour of private actors (which may be
able to relocate their activities to avoid their regulations), but the
behaviour of other states seeking unilaterally to regulate an issue
area according to their own principles, which may not be the
preferred principles of the state in question (Reidenberg 2002).
In short, even though the massive expansion of the Internet and of
e-commerce have not substantially curtailed state power, as more
hopeful libertarians predicted, it has had important consequences
for states’ relationship with private actors and with each other.
Private actors are not replacing states and creating their own forms
of order, but they are often able to exploit jurisdictional
ambiguities to their own advantage within the existing state
system. As Michael Froomkin (1997) argues, the Internet presents
private actors with new opportunities for arbitrage in many sectors
of activity. The Internet vastly lowers the cost of trans-border
communication, making it easier for some private actors to avoid
undesirable forms of regulation by relocating their activities from
one jurisdiction to another. The ability of actors to engage in such
arbitrage will vary according to the degree to which states differ in
their regulatory goals and capacity in a particular policy area. For
example, Froomkin (1997) suggests that the ability of private
actors to use regulatory arbitrage to avoid taxes will be limited
because there are few regimes which offer strong banking secrecy
(although see below). Further, some private actors will be better
able than others to engage in arbitrage. Peter Swire (1998) argues
that “mice” (small, mobile private actors) will find it far easier to
relocate their activities than “elephants” (large actors with
substantial, relatively immobile assets). For example, if a state
seeks to shut down a small-scale pornography or gambling website
which breaches its laws, the website’s owners may quickly and
easily set up a new site in a different jurisdiction with laxer
regulation. The same is by no means necessarily true of the
websites of large firms with valuable corporate reputations and
fixed assets.
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However, states too have new means of control that they can use
in order to discipline private actors that would otherwise escape
their grasp. As Swire (1998) also points out, states are not limited
to direct regulation. They can also seek to use indirect means,
pressing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or other actors to
implement state policy. For example, states might require ISPs to
block their users from having access to a particular site, or to take
down sites with certain kinds of content from their servers. More
generally, to adapt Jonathan Zittrain’s (2003; see as an alternative
Birnhack and Elkin-Korin 2003) terminology, a small group of
privileged private actors can become ‘points of control’ that states
can then use to exert control over a much broader group of other
private actors. This is because the former private actors control
chokepoints in the information infrastructure or in other key
networks of resources. They can block or control flows of data or
of other valuable resources among a wide variety of other private
actors. Thus, it is not always necessary for a state to exercise
direct control over all the relevant private actors in a given issue
area in order to be a successful regulator. If there is a private actor
which controls a chokepoint, the state may be able to press this
private actor into service, and transform it into a point of control.
It can then require the private actor to regulate on its behalf,
blocking or facilitating the flow of information or resources so as
to control what other private actors do.
On the one hand, states can use points of control effectively to
recreate national borders in some issue areas. They may induce
ISPs to regulate other private actors on their behalf and limit the
latter’s access to goods or material which are illegal within the
jurisdiction of the state in question, but which are accessible
through the Internet or another means of electronic
communications. Thus, for example, some European states require
their domestic ISPs to block users from accessing neo-Nazi
websites which are located in the US and elsewhere (Frydman &
Rorive 2002, Reidenberg 2004), while the US government uses
ISPs to regulate access to copyrighted content (Birnhack and Elkin
Koren 2003).
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On the other, states may be able to use points of control as a
means of affecting what private actors located in other
jurisdictions can or cannot do. Some key private actors
(multinational corporations, international self-regulatory bodies)
are able to affect what a wide variety of other private actors, across
various jurisdictions, can or cannot do. In relevant issue areas
where states are in disagreement, these actors’ rules and standards
provide an effective international regulatory lowest common
denominator (Farrell 2003b). For example, in the absence of
international agreement on which kinds of goods can or cannot be
sold through auction, the rules enforced by major e-commerce
firms such as eBay or Yahoo! effectively help set the standards for
what is allowable. If these firms forbid their users from buying or
selling a particular kind of item, it will obviously become
considerably more difficult for sellers of these items to find buyers,
and buyers to find sellers. If states are successful in pressing these
powerful private actors into service as points of control, they can
not only recreate their borders (i.e. reassert control over actors
within their own jurisdiction) but also assert control over private
actors located in other jurisdictions where the powerful private
actor holds a chokepoint. As Yochem Benkler (2000, p. 179) notes
in a somewhat different context:
If states can affect how all multi-jurisdictional players in
the Internet service market structure their relationships
to their users everywhere, then the practical reach of
each state’s jurisdiction to increase the costs of, and
shape the way people in other jurisdictions interact
with, information it deems harmful - say, Nazi
propaganda or pornography - is in fact quite extensive.
Clearly, the extent to which states can use certain private actors
as points of control will depend on the extent to which these
private actors actually occupy chokepoints in the information
infrastructure, and are able to use these chokepoints to control
flows of information or resources. This will vary considerably from
issue area to issue area. But in many issue areas there are private
actors that do indeed occupy such chokepoints. These actors’

2006]

REGULATING INFORMATION FLOWS

15

ability to control what other private actors and individuals can do
may have gaps (it is usually possible for determined and
technologically adept users to avoid these chokepoints) but still
serves as a reasonably effective substitute for traditional
regulation.
Thus, in conclusion, the work of legal scholars on the governance
of the Internet and e-commerce provides us with a rich body of
both empirical information and theoretical insights, from which
we can perhaps begin to construct a more general account of stateprivate interaction. It is to this task that I turn in the next section.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING STATE-PRIVATE
ACTOR RELATIONS
Building on the existing literatures in international relations and
Internet law, I argue that three factors are likely to affect states’
desire and ability to press private actors into service as regulators
on their behalf. First, and most obvious, is states’ need (or lack of
same) to deal with problems of policy interdependence in a given
issue area. Building on Froomkin’s arguments about regulatory
arbitrage, I argue that this will depend on the degree of
homogeneity or heterogeneity of states’ regulatory preferences and
practices. Second, is the presence or ‘absence’ of suitable private
actors in a given issue area. Here, I borrow from Zittrain, and from
Birnback and Elkin-Koren, to argue that this will depend on
whether or not there are private actors that serve as ‘points of
control.’ Finally, building on the existing literature in
international relations theory, I argue that states’ bargaining power
vis-a-vis private actors will determine their ability to press
suitable private actors into service on their behalf.
As the introduction argues, globalization and the Internet do not
confront states with a loss of authority so much as with a new set
of challenges stemming from increased policy interdependence.
Private actors are not empowered vis-a-vis states in any absolute
sense, and are highly unlikely to take up the reins of command.
Instead, to adapt Froomkin’s argument slightly, the increased
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interdependence resulting from the Internet and associated
technologies will increase private actors’ ability to engage in
regulatory arbitrage where there are substantial differences
between states’ regulatory systems. All other things being equal,
small, flexible private actors, with few fixed assets, can take
advantage of differences between regulatory systems, locating
their activities in that state where the regulatory system is most
congenial to them. Thus, for example, US businesses that were
interested in making a profit from online gambling were able to
relocate their activities to countries like Antigua, which had lax
regulation of gambling. Similarly, private citizens located within
the boundaries of the US could evade the regulatory power of the
state by gambling online through services located in offshore
locations like Antigua or Gibraltar.
Logically, then, the degree to which private actors can engage in
regulatory arbitrage will depend on the degree to which states’
regulatory preferences are similar or dissimilar. These preferences
will be a function of previously existing domestic social bargains
within states; as Berger (2000) suggests, states will feel obliged to
protect these bargains against outside pressures. If all states have
the same regulatory preferences, and are able to enforce those
preferences reasonably well, then there is little scope for private
actors to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Even small, flexible
private actors will have no very strong reason to locate their
activities in one jurisdiction rather another, besides the usual
reasons of labour and capital costs, infrastructure etc. In contrast,
if there are substantial differences between states’ regulatory
preferences (or, to a lesser degree, their ability to enforce those
preferences), private actors will have very considerable scope
indeed for regulatory arbitrage. All other things being equal, small,
flexible private actors will have a strong incentive to locate their
activities in jurisdictions where the regulatory preferences of the
state provide them with the greatest freedom to purvey their
product. By the same token, individuals located within a
jurisdiction which bans a particular online activity will
themselves be able to engage in a form of arbitrage. They can use
the Internet to transact with offshore entities that are located in
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other jurisdictions and that provide the service in question, thus
evading the laws of their own jurisdiction.
Thus, the degree to which states’ regulatory preferences are similar
or dissimilar will be a key dimension dictating state choice. One
can draw a distinction between (a) issue areas where states have
similar preferences, and (b) issue areas where states have dissimilar
preferences. In the former, cross-border information technologies
like the Internet will not provide significant arbitrage
opportunities either for private actors who are willing to relocate
their activities offshore, or for individuals who are seeking out
offshore businesses providing services that are illegal in the
individuals’ home jurisdiction. This is not to say that there will be
no scope for arbitrage whatsoever. Even if all states have the same
regulatory preferences, it may be more complicated for them to
regulate cross border activities (different national enforcement
agencies will need to coordinate with each other, share
information etc). Still, the scope of these arbitrage opportunities
will be limited. In contrast, there will be far greater arbitrage
opportunities in contexts where states’ regulatory preferences
differ substantially. Here, we may expect ceteris paribus that
nimble private actors can locate their activities in friendly
jurisdictions, and that individuals can use the Internet to procure
services that are illegal within their own jurisdiction, but not
illegal in a different state with different preferences.
The second key dimension that explains state choice is the
presence or non-presence of private actors that provide “points of
control” in a given issue area. As noted, these are a special kind of
private actor - they occupy choke-points in the infrastructure of
information or resource flows, and can thus potentially regulate
the online activities of a much wider set of actors. We may
reasonably expect that where such private actors exist, states will
have a strong incentive to seek to press them into service as
regulators where they can. By so doing, states can offload some of
the costs of regulation onto a third party, and exercise substantial
control over what a wide variety of other private actors can or
cannot do. For example, states may use ISPs as points of control,
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requiring them to block access to certain external websites, and to
take down certain kinds of content from user homepages that are
hosted on their servers. By imposing these requirements, states
can use ISPs to control the activities of a much wider group of
actors - the ISPs’ users - preventing them from having access to
certain kinds of material, even if that material is located offshore.
Thus, in issue areas where there are private actors that provide
points of control, we may expect states to take advantage of this,
and to press these private actors into service to regulate the
activities of a much larger group of actors. In contrast, in issue
areas where there are no such points of control, we may expect
states either to use more traditional instruments of regulation
where these are available, or not to regulate at all, where they
aren’t.
Mapping these two dimensions against each other provides the
following 2x2 table, which describes the likely regulatory outcome
for each combination of state preferences and presence or absence
of points of control.

States’ regulatory
preferences/points of
control

Points of control present

Points of control
absent

Similar regulatory
preferences

Hybrid regulation (private
actors embedded in
international agreements)

Traditional forms of
regulation (domestic
and international)

Dissimilar regulatory
preferences

Recreation of borders/States
vying for influence over
points of control

Stalemate

Figure 1
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In figure 1, the vertical axis represents the similarity or
dissimilarity of states’ regulatory preferences in a given issue area.
The horizontal axis represents the presence or absence of private
actors that might serve as points of control in that issue area.
Where states have similar preferences, and points of control are
present we may expect that states will opt for hybrid forms of
regulation (Farrell 2003a). In hybrid regulation, states agree on an
international framework that lays out the principles of
cooperation in a given issue area - but delegate much of the
implementation of these principles to the relevant private actors,
which become points of control for the states in question. As with
traditional international institutions, states may bargain over the
specific features of the institution, and the distribution of costs
and responsibilities associated with it. However, they will delegate
as much as possible of the actual implementation of their
preferences to private actors which have more extensive technical
knowledge and are better positioned to block or redirect
information flows.
Where states have similar preferences over regulation, and points
of control are absent, we are in the traditional world of
international regulation described exhaustively by Keohane (1984)
and other institutionalists. States will create international
institutions where necessary to reduce transaction costs and to
monitor compliance, perhaps distributing the burdens and benefits
of cooperation according to the underlying bargaining power of the
states in question (Krasner 1991).
Where states have dissimilar preferences, and points of control are
present, we may expect one of two outcomes. Where states are
primarily interested in protecting their own domestic bargains,
and have little interest in what other states do, we may expect
them to use points of control to recreate national borders. That is,
they will seek to use points of control to reassert authority over
their own citizens, by regulating these citizens’ access to services
and materials located outside their national borders. Depending on
which private actors are pressed into service, this may have
knock-on consequences for other states. For example, France and
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Germany have pressed Internet auction services such as Yahoo!
and eBay to regulate their citizens’ access to Nazi materials and
paraphernalia (Farrell 2003b). Both Yahoo! and eBay have
introduced policies that prevent all of their users from buying or
selling Nazi-related materials, regardless of whether the user lives
in France, Germany or elsewhere. Thus, France and Germany’s
preferences have implications for the citizens of states such as the
US, which does not forbid the sale of Nazi-related materials. This
may potentially lead to clashes between states. The risk of
disputes between states will be even more marked where states are
interested not only in protecting their own social bargains, but
also in influencing how individuals and private actors in other
states behave. Here, we may expect to see states actively vying for
influence over potential ‘points of control’ in a given issue area.
Each state will seek to ensure that the points of control in a given
issue area implement its regulatory preferences rather than the
(clashing) preferences of another state. In the absence of any basis
for agreement among states, the policies of key private actors may
indeed set an effective international regulatory lowest common
denominator, although the extent to which this is true will
obviously vary together with the scope of influence of these
private actors.
Finally, where states have dissimilar and incompatible
preferences, and points of control are absent, we may expect to see
stalemate (Moravcsik 1997). States will be unable to reach
agreement among themselves over international institutional
arrangements, since they do not agree about the underlying
principles of regulation for a given issue area. However, they will
also be unable effectively either to rebuild national borders
through points of control, or to use points of control to shape the
international regulatory lowest common denominator.
The two cells where points of control are absent receive extensive
discussion in the existing literature. The cells where points of
control are present are of considerably greater relevance to the
research agenda that this article proposes. What is likely to
determine specific outcomes in these cells? To be more precise:
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when will states be successful in press-ganging private actors into
their service as points of control? When states vie for influence
with each other over potential points of control, which states are
likely to win, and which to lose?
In order to answer these questions, it’s necessary to return to the
sources of state bargaining power vis-a-vis private actors. As noted,
market size is often a poor measure of power (Newman and Posner
2005); states may be unable to deploy market power effectively
without appropriate regulatory structures. While market size may
affect a state’s bargaining power vis-a-vis a given private actor
(ceteris paribus, states with larger internal markets are likely to
offer greater market opportunities to such actors than states with
smaller markets), it will only do so if the state in question is able
selectively to grant or withdraw market access to and from private
actors who comply or fail to comply with the state’s wishes.
Therefore, it’s necessary to supplement an examination of market
size with a focus on whether existing domestic rules allow a state
to deploy, or not to deploy its market strength in a given area of
regulation (Farrell 2003b, Bach & Newman 2004). More
specifically, a state’s ability to bargain vis-a-vis a given private
actor will depend (a) on the private actor’s specific exposure to the
jurisdiction of the state (a function inter alia of market
opportunities and the extent to which the private actor’s fixed
assets are subject to the jurisdiction of the state), and (b) on the
regulatory instruments through which the state can make credible
threats or promises to the private actor in order to induce the
private actor to implement its preferences.
This has some interesting implications. First, we can reasonably
expect that states as a collectivity will be in a stronger bargaining
position vis-a-vis private actors that offer potential points of
control where they share regulatory preferences than when they do
not share them. Second, where states disagree over how a
particular issue area should be regulated, some states will be better
positioned than others to exercise influence over points of control.
Specifically, states that not only have jurisdiction over assets
belonging to the relevant private actors, but also have appropriate
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policy instruments which they can use to convert that market
power into bargaining leverage, will be better able to influence
potential points of control than will states with small markets, or
even states with large markets but without appropriate policy
instruments that would allow them to make credible threats or
promises. Thus, in issue areas where states have strongly opposed
interests and preferences, private actors that offer potential
“points of control” will be more likely to be influenced by those
states that (a) have jurisdiction over their assets or provide
substantial market opportunities for these actors, and (b) have
policy instruments that allow them to make credible threats or
promises with regard to these assets or opportunities.
Thus, in summary, I suggest that we need to understand the
interaction of three factors - the congruity (or lack of same) of state
regulatory preferences, the presence or absence of points of
control, and the bargaining strength of states vis-a-vis potential
points of control, in order to explain regulatory outcomes. By
looking at the way in which state preferences and the presence or
absence of points of control interact, we can explain the broad
regulatory structures that are likely to emerge in different issue
areas. By focusing more closely on the determinants of bargaining
strength, we can make predictions as to which states are likely to
win and which to lose, where state preferences clash, and where
points of control are present.

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO E-COMMERCE
REGULATION
While an exhaustive test of hypotheses derived from the above
framework is outside the scope of this article, a brief plausibility
probe, drawing on case studies in the existing literature, may help
establish whether the framework seems likely to provide a useful
description of reality. First, the dispute over gambling regulation
described in the introduction provides us with a case in which
states clearly had conflicting preferences, but in which points of
control (US-based financial institutions) were present. Second, the
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dispute between the EU and US over privacy regulation (Farrell
2003a) provides a case in which states (eventually) had compatible
preferences, and in which there were points of control (selfregulatory organizations). Finally, the vexed issue of e-commerce
taxation (Paris 2003) presents an example of a policy area where
state preferences clash, but where there are no obvious points of
control.
Internet gambling presents an example of an issue-area where
states have different - and conflicting - preferences. On the one
hand, the US federal government has typically sought to regulate
gambling through electronic communication, and some state level
officials have aggressively sought to shut down gambling
operations. While Congress has failed to pass legislation that
explicitly bans Internet gambling, the government has interpreted
the previously-existing Wire Wager Act as forbidding it, and has
sought to prosecute those involved. This has prompted figures
from the US gambling industry and elsewhere to set up Internet
gambling operations in more gambling friendly jurisdictions such
as Antigua, which sought their main custom from US consumers.
While US authorities were successful in prosecuting individuals
who had maintained a US presence, and in preventing gambling
operations from offering shares for purchase to US citizens, they
were unable either (a) directly to prevent US citizens from
gambling using offshore websites, or (b) to shut down these
websites which were located outside the jurisdiction of US law.
Nor did Antigua have any incentive to shut down gambling
operations at the behest of the US; at one point gambling
operations accounted for over 10% of Antigua’s GDP (Thayer
2004).
The solution adopted by US authorities - first at the state level in
New York, and then at the federal level - was to attack offshore
gambling sites indirectly, by requiring banks and other financial
entities to block transactions. These banks and financial entities
provided a possible point of control for US authorities; they
occupied a chokepoint in the relationship between offshore
gambling websites and their US-based customers. Money had to
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flow back and forth between US-based gamblers and offshore
gambling operations if the former were to be paid when they won
their bets, and the latter were to make a profit. New York State
Attorney-General Elliot Spitzer’s office began to pursue financial
institutions aggressively, threatening Citibank with prosecution
for profiting from illegal activity, and pressing it to make a
substantial donation to compulsive gambler counselling services,
and to agree to block gambling transactions in future (Manter
2003). A similar action against the popular Internet financial
intermediary PayPal resulted in a substantial fine. The US
Department of Justice built on this precedent by threatening to
prosecute any firm that provided financial services to offshore
Internet gambling operations. These threats have resulted in the
creation of a self-regulatory regime for financial intermediaries
such as banks and credit card companies in which they seek to
identify and block gambling transactions involving US citizens.
It is unclear whether the US effort to block its citizens from
gambling on the Internet will work over the longer term; gambling
sites are beginning to exploit ambiguities within the US legal
regime to promote and legitimize their activities. Nonetheless, in
the short run it has had devastating consequences for the Antiguan
gambling industry which has dwindled to a small fraction of its
former size (Thayer 2004). This prompted Antigua to take an
ultimately unsuccessful WTO action against the US, arguing, in
the words of Antigua’s chief foreign affairs representative that the
US enforced its prohibition on gambling by “blocking credit card
transactions and penalising credit card companies and banks that
facilitate them” (Sanders 2004).
Thus, in a policy area where (a) there was substantial disagreement
between states’ regulatory preferences, and (b) potential points of
control in the financial industry, the US sought to stop its citizens
from using offshore gambling operations by requiring these points
of control to block transactions as the framework would have
predicted. It thus had some success in recreating a national border,
and in reasserting its authority over US citizens who wished to
gamble using offshore websites. This had quite substantial knock-
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on consequences for another state, Antigua. Had Antigua itself had
some leverage over the financial intermediaries involved, we
might have expected it to seek to counter US influence at that
level; instead, it opted to seek recourse at the WTO.
Privacy is a highly important policy area - persistent fears among
consumers that their privacy was threatened by new technologies
was frequently cited as a serious problem for the expansion of ecommerce (White House 1996). The WWW and Internet, together
with more mundane technologies such as consumer loyalty
programs, permitted new kinds of information gathering, while
advances in computing power and database programs allowed
businesses to engage in quite sophisticated forms of ‘data mining.’
There was substantial agreement among advanced industrialized
democracies over what the goals of privacy protection should be,
at least on the level of principle. The OECD Privacy Principles
represented a general agreement among its member states as to the
basic principles of privacy regulation in an era of rapidly advances
in information technology. However, there was a quite substantial
disagreement among states as to how these principles should be
implemented for the private sector, the US preferring selfregulation, and European countries preferring binding legislation.
These differences in approach led to confrontation between the
European Union and the United States (for a more complete
account, see Farrell 2003a). In the late 1990's, the European Union
passed a Data Protection Directive which sought to create a
common European framework of ‘data protection’ principles - but
also to restrict the movement of individuals’ personal data to
countries outside the EU which did not have “adequate” privacy
protection. The reasoning behind this was clear. European officials
feared that if they allowed personal data to be exported beyond the
reach of European law, they would be giving businesses free
license to circumvent the EU regime by exporting data, processing
it abroad, and reaping the results at home. However, this clearly
had adverse implications for EU trading partners which had laxer
regimes, in particular the US, which was highly unlikely to be
considered “adequate” by EU authorities (Swire & Litan 1998).
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The US initially responded to the EU by making counter-threats,
and by seeking to encourage the post-haste creation of an effective
self-regulatory regime, through encouraging so-called “privacy seal
organizations” to begin offering their services to firms. These
organizations were perceived by both EU and US negotiators as
important ‘points of control;’ the US hoped that they would
diffuse a self-regulatory model of privacy protection
internationally, while the EU hoped that they might allow the EU
to ratchet up private sector standards of privacy protection within
the US (Farrell 2003a).
The result of this confrontation was an eventual agreement
between the EU and US on a ‘hybrid solution,’ the so-called Safe
Harbor Arrangement, which combined on the one hand elements
of government oversight, and on the other a strong element of selfregulation, delegating many aspects of implementation to privacy
seal organizations. It is to be noted, however, that this solution did
not emerge naturally or easily from the shared understanding of
the EU and US regarding privacy rights (although its emergence
was greatly facilitated by the commitments of both EU and US to
the OECD privacy principles). Instead, it required a serious
reconsideration by both sides of what the appropriate means
towards privacy protection were. In other words, some basic
elements of the final agreement were not present in the ex ante
views of privacy shared by both sides. Instead, a greater level of
agreement on the underlying issues of enforcement was created
through argument that occurred in the process of negotiation itself
(Farrell 2003a). It is quite possible that had negotiations gone
slightly differently, the eventual solution of a hybrid regime would
not have emerged.
Thus, the privacy case study provides only partial support for the
framework. On the one hand, there was some degree of existing
consensus on the basic principles of privacy regulation, which
helped facilitate the creation of a hybrid regime combining an
international agreement with points of control. But on the other,
final agreement on this regime was only possible because of a
process of argument and persuasion, which could have gone quite
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differently. Thus, while the arguments advanced in the simple
framework above help to explain the empirical outcome, they
clearly don’t provide a complete account of the circumstances
leading up to it.
Finally, the rapid expansion of e-commerce poses a substantial
long-term challenge to states’ ability to raise taxes. As Roland
Paris notes (the following account relies extensively on Paris
2003), the current international taxation regime faces extreme
difficulties in accommodating e-commerce transactions. Typically,
states collect direct taxes on the basis of source (they seek to
collect taxes from those who have sources of income located in
their jurisdiction), residence (they seek to collect taxes on the
income of residents of their jurisdiction, regardless of whether
these residents’ sources of income are elsewhere) or both. A
complicated international tax regime has been created, which
seeks to avoid “double taxation” of individuals and economic
actors, in part by using the principle of ‘permanent establishment’
(whether a business has a physical presence in a country) to
determine the geographic location of sources of income and of
individuals’ residency.
This, however, is extremely hard to do with regard to e-commerce
transactions. Johnson and Post’s logic applies with a vengeance;
when an e-commerce transaction takes place across multiple
jurisdictions, as many do, it is difficult to determine which
jurisdiction(s) should be able to tax it. It is possible for a firm to do
a substantial amount of business in a particular jurisdiction,
without having any permanent physical presence in that
jurisdiction that would give rise to a tax liability. Multinational
firms have always been able to engage in some degree of transfer
pricing to lower their tax burden. However, the advent of ecommerce and of business based on cross-border information
transfer radically increases the opportunity of firms to engage in
this form of regulatory arbitrage; the business consultancy firm,
Ernst and Young, recommends that their clients take advantage of
the Internet to locate geographically neutral services in low-tax
jurisdictions (Paris 2003).
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This poses a quite serious challenge to states’ abilities to raise
revenues through direct taxation (and to a lesser extent through
indirect taxation too). There are no reliable statistics on the size of
the international e-commerce sector, but there is general
consensus that it is important, and growing. States - and especially
high taxation states - are likely to suffer increasingly large revenue
losses as the e-commerce sector expands. However, there are few
obvious solutions. In contrast to many other policy areas affected
by e-commerce, there are no obvious third parties that might serve
as points of control. Furthermore, it is difficult for states to
coordinate action among each other. Taxation is a notoriously
sensitive topic for states. As the OECD’s Technical Advisory
Group on the topic notes:
The fact is ... that recourse to international exchanges of
information and assistance in collection for purposes of
taxing business profits is still the exception rather than
the rule, especially for developing countries (p.18,
OECD 2003).
The problem is that states seeking to tax business profits are
unlikely to reach agreement; each wants to maximize its own tax
revenues. More generally, the question of whether to reform the
tax regime in order to better tackle the problems of e-commerce
has strong and obvious distributional implications. States with
low taxes on business profits are likely to prefer the status quo, as
it means that international corporations are more likely to engage
in transfer pricing arrangements that increase their revenues, and
mobile actors are more likely to base themselves in these
jurisdictions. States with high taxes on business profits equally
clearly have the opposite incentive, and are likely to want reform.
Roland Paris (2003) argues that states nonetheless face a collective
problem over the longer term which makes cooperation a
functional imperative. Because e-commerce is likely to continue
expanding in importance, and because the current regime is so
poorly suited to capturing taxes from e-commerce (so that in
principle some businesses may be able to avoid taxation
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altogether) states will probably have to move taxation to the
international level, creating a new regime in which there would be
considerably higher levels of coordination and collaboration. In the
long run, Paris may quite possibly be right, especially if the
problems of e-commerce present a major fiscal challenge to
powerful states such as the US and EU member states. However,
there is little evidence at the moment of any great appetite among
states to move in this direction, and considerable evidence of
dissension. In the words of the OECD Technical Advisory Group:
Most countries would probably evaluate any suggestion
to change the current treaty norms on the basis of their
current domestic law and the impact that this would
have on their tax revenues. On that basis, it is likely
that the process of reaching an international agreement
concerning new rules for taxing business profits would
be long and difficult (p.26, OECD 2003).
Thus, the taxation of e-commerce presents an example of an issue
area where states have conflicting preferences over whether and
how the current regime should be reformed, and no obvious points
of control through which states could reassert authority over the
relevant private actors. As the framework would predict, the result
is stalemate, and a continued inability to reach a mutually
agreeable modus vivendi, as the combination of increasing
interdependence and variation between states’ taxation policies
offers substantial arbitration opportunities for private actors.
In conclusion then, a limited plausibility probe, drawing on three
prominent cases in the recent literature, suggests that the
explanatory framework set out in the previous section has some
real explanatory value. As the case of privacy regulation
illustrates, it has some limitations. Nonetheless, this framework,
simple though it is, appears on the basis of an initial test of
plausibility to offer a highly useful account of state choice in a
world where they can work through private actors.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I’ve argued that there’s an important gap in our
current understanding of the relationship between states and
private actors. While we have a substantial body of knowledge on
the circumstances under which private actors can, or cannot
influence states, and we have some hypotheses about the
circumstances under which they can create their own spaces of
transnational governance, we know very little indeed about the
circumstances under which states are likely to wish to work
through private actors in order to achieve policy outcomes. In part,
this is a function of the way that the international relations debate
has developed; both those who privilege states and those who
privilege private actors as the key actors in international relations
have tended not to be interested in this relationship because of
their underlying theoretical commitments. It is also the result of
the way in which more recent debates on globalization tend to
focus on very broad and general claims about secular changes (or
the lack of same) in the relationship between states and private
actors in world politics, neglecting inquiry into their specific
micro-relationships (Kahler and Lake 2003).
More precisely, I set out to provide a more specific understanding
of the circumstances under which states will seek to work through
private actors, building upon an important new body of work on
states’ bargaining strength vis-a-vis private actors. I seek to
integrate arguments from a rich body of legal-theoretical literature
on the evolution of the Internet and e-commerce. This literature
not only provides a very useful body of empirical information, but
also important theoretical insights. I show that arguments about
state preferences and regulatory arbitrage on the one hand, and the
presence of private actors that offer ‘points of control’ on the
other, can be brought together into a unified framework that
provides predictions as to the kinds of outcomes we may expect in
different areas of policy. I then conduct a “plausibility probe,” by
examining three cases from the existing literature, and find that
they offer good support for the plausibility of the framework.
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E-commerce and the Internet offer an especially rich testingground for arguments about state-private actor relations. However
if the claims advanced in this article have merit, they can be
expected to have explanatory power in other important areas of
state-private actor interaction in the international economy, such
as financial regulation (Goodman & Pauly 1993, Mosley
unpublished) and standard setting (Mattli and Büthe 2003). Testing
these claims - and those of rival frameworks of explanation constitutes an important future research agenda for international
relations.
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